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 Empirical Section and Key Events:  
 Introduction 
- What is the difference between Sunnis and Shias? 
- Is it all really a Shia-Sunni conflict that empowers ISIS? 
- How is ISIS promoting itself as a leader of the Sunnis? 
- Who is ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)? 
- What is the background of the people who join terrorist organizations? 
- Indoctrination of young Sunni-Muslims 
 Problem area, research question and choice of theory 
 Prime minster Maliki paving the way towards an ISIS resurrection. 
- Who is Nouri Al-Maliki? 
- Deepening the sectarian divide in order to solidify Iranian/Shia hegemony over Iraq. 
- Weak Iraqi state and strong Iranian militias. 
 Al-Anbar protests  
- How did different actors react to what the Iraqi government was doing to the 
Sunnis? 
 ISIS takes advantage of the Syrian weak state to gain more traction. 
 Going back to Iraq with vengeance 
 Who is joining ISIS in Iraq? 
 Sageman´s study of global salafi jihadism 
-Social background: 
-Psychological make up: 
-Joining the jihad: 
-Social affiliation  
 Coolesaet and the European cases 
-Social background: 
-Psychological make up: 
-Joining the jihad: 
-Social affiliation: 
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 Motivations behind joining: 
-Oppression of Muslims in Europe: 
-Boredom: 
-Sympathy: 
-Religion: 
 Brainwash and mind control: 
-Is it possible to leave the Islamic state for the indoctrinated, and how do we tackle 
the recruitment of the Islamic state? 
-A case of indoctrination/brainwash from the Middle East: 
 Conclusion and consequences  
 Paper’s conclusion 
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--9.4.2003: The United States invades Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. 
And starts disbanding 500 thousand Iraqi military personnel and 300 thousand intelligence 
personnel and denies them from any retirement benefits/salary effectively cutting all means 
of livelihood for them and publicly shaming them in what was called “The De-Bathification 
process” 
--2003: The militant group "Tanzeem al Tawheed wal Jihad" (ISIS’s first name) which is led by 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is established. 
--2004: Al-Zarqawi pledges allegiance to Osama bin Laden and the group changes its name to 
"Qaidat al Jihad Fee Bilad al Rafidayn" (The Jihad Base in The Levant) 
This pledge of allegiance and according to ISIS later was more of an attempt to show that there 
was one Jihadi front in the world, even though the two organizations had fundamental 
differences, according to Abu Mohamad al Adnani (the official spokesperson of ISIS). 
Zarqawi wanted to attack the Shias in Iran but Bin Laden refused that, to maintain good 
relations with Iran and to keep Al-Qaida's supply lines in Afghanistan through Iran. 
--15.12.2005 the establishment of the "Mujahedeen Shura council" which is an umbrella for 8 
Sunni Jihadi groups one of which is the jihad base in the Levant. 
--8.6.2006: Al-Zarqawi the Amir (ruler) of the jihad base in the Levant is killed. 
--13.10.2006: Abu Ayoub Al-Masrei (The leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq) announces the formation of 
the Islamic State in Iraq, replacing the Mujahedeen Shura council. 
--13.10.2006: Abu Ayoub Al-Masrei (The leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq) announces Abu Omar Al-
Baghdadi the leader of the Islamic state in Iraq. 
--19.4.2010: Abu Ayoub Al-Masrei (The leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq) along with Abu Omar Al-
Baghdadi and his war minister Abu Hamzah Al-Mouhajer are killed in a joint American/Iraqi 
operation. 
--19.4.2010: Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is announced to be the new Amir (ruler) for the Islamic 
state in Iraq. 
--..8.2011: Al-Baghdadi establishes “Jabhat Al-Nousra” in Syria to be led by Abu Mohamad Al-
Joulani.  Al-Baghdadi sends money, soldiers and makes plans for J.N.  
J.N is to be a branch for the Islamic state in Iraq in Syria. 
--21-12-2012 Al-Anbar protests start in Iraq listing the following reasons: 
-Corruption. –Unemployment. -Lack of public services. -Marginalization of Sunnis. -Unfair 
treatment of prisoners. -Low salaries of the “Sunni Awakenings Militias”. -The abuse of the 
De-Bathification laws. -The Iranian interference in Iraq. 
--9.4.2013: Al-Baghdadi announces abolishing the names "Jabhat al Nousra" and "The Islamic 
state in Iraq" and announces the establishment of the "Islamic state in Iraq and Sham" ISIS. 
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--April.2013: After growing stronger and establishing a name for himself, Al-Jolani the leader of 
J.N does not accept Al-Baghdadi's orders and goes around him and pledges allegiance to Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri the leader of Al-Qaida, thus actively disobeying his seniors to prevent the Syrian 
organization from being overtaken by the Iraqi one. 
By pledging allegiance to Al-Zawahiri, Al-Jolani was able to keep his legitimacy as a jihadi group 
leader, since technically Al-Qaida is the top command in the Jihadi world. 
--23-4-2013 The Iraqi army attacks the protestors in Hoygah in Kirkuk. 
--24-4-2013 The Sunni protestors establish Jaish Al-A’asha’er (the tribe’s army) and control 
the town of Suleiman Back –south of Kirkuk- including a police station and an army base. 
Additionally several attacks are reported around Iraq and several casualties among the police 
and the protestors are reported as well. The protestors control west of Mosel including a 
police station. 
--25-4-2013 The Iraqi army gains back the control of the city of Mosel, and besiege the 
protestors who took control of the town of Suleiman Back and gives them 48 hours to 
surrender. The protestors and the Iraqi forces reach an agreement where the protesters 
withdraw from the town. 
--26.4.2013 Massive protests in the Sunni protests under the title “Burning the demands” 
signaling that the protesters are shifting from peaceful protests to armed conflict with the 
Iraqi government.  
Declaring the formation of Jaish Al-Izaah wal Karamah (the army of pride and dignity) which 
is supported by the Sunni tribes. 
--08.11.2013: Al-Zawahiri announces the disbandment of "The Islamic state in Iraq and Sham" 
And assigns Jabhat Al-Nousra to work in Syria, And the Islamic state in Iraq to work in Iraq. 
Since Al-Zawahiri has no real authority over both organizations, and since Al-Joulani pledged 
allegiance to him only to absolve himself from obeying Al-Baghdadi, Zawahiri's words fell flat. 
--12.6.2014: ISIS invades and occupies Mosel, Tikrit and large areas in North and West Iraq 
along with the biggest oil refinery in Beigi-Iraq. 
--29.6.2014: Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi announces the establishment of the Caliphate, and 
changes the name "Islamic State in Iraq and Sham" into the "Islamic State" 
--..9.2014: An international coalition is assembled to fight the Islamic State. 
-- 2015: many Jihadi groups around the world from Nigeria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Yemen, Egypt, Libya and others pledge allegiance to ISIS. 
 
--17.12.2015 Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir announces the formation of an Islamic 
coalition containing 34 states aimed to fight ISIS. 
Introduction: Paladins or Terrorists? 
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Conflict is deeply impeded in human nature, and one of the byproducts of conflict is terrorism, 
more specifically terrorism linked to Islamic-Sunni-Salafi religious groups like Al-Qaida and ISIS. 
This type of terrorism is one of the most prominent issues these days, and has been since 9/11. 
We will set out to explore in this paper the reasons and the motives that drive people to join 
radical groups like ISIS.  
Paladins are holly warriors who fought on the side of the weak and unjustly treated and for 
causes they deemed righteous and just, we will set out to find out if the people who join these 
radical groups like ISIS are Paladins or really just terrorists.  
Please note: Before we start we need to make clear that when we use the term “Middle East”, 
we are referring to the region that contains the following countries:  
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, The GCC, Egypt, and Iran. 
We also use the term ISIS interchangeably with Al-Qaida, please note that ISIS was the Al-
Qaida’s branch in Iraq until they fell apart with the head command of Al-Qaida in 2013 and 
announced their independence from them.  
Up until then, ISIS existed under different names and had its own networks, command, structure 
and resources but it belonged to the higher Al-Qaida command structure. 
 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the American forces, the destabilization of that country, 
destroying its strong central government and the later disbandment of its military and security 
forces left a void in power that slowly started being filled by Shia and Sunni militias which tried 
to regain the control and order of Iraq, this battle for stability and order was a part of a bigger 
regional cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran for hegemony over the region, as Iran being 
the representative of Shias and Saudi Arabia being the representative of Sunnis: 
“The best framework for understanding the regional politics of the Middle East is as a 
cold war in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play the leading roles. These two main actors 
are not confronting each other militarily; rather, their contest for influence plays out in 
the domestic political systems of the region’s weak states. It is a struggle over the 
direction of the Middle East’s domestic politics more than it is a purely military contest.” 
(Gause, 2014, p.1) 
This cold war is a result of weakening of central governments in the Middle East (like in Syria 
and Iraq) which opened the door for regional powers –mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia- to 
intervene through proxy wars via sectarian militias like the Iranian backed Shia militia Hezbollah 
and the Saudi backed Sunni-Salafi militia in Syria Ahrar Al-Sham. 
 
What is the difference between Sunnis and Shias? 
 
The divide and conflict between Sunnis and Shias is not new, it actually goes back to the very 
beginning of Islam itself, and understanding the origin of the divide will give us an idea about 
the two main conflicted parties in the Middle East these days and their regional patriarchs: 
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“A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a companion of 
Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic community, over the 
objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. 
The opposing camps in the succession debate eventually evolved into Islam’s two main 
sects. Shias, a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for “partisans of Ali,” believe that 
Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis, meaning followers of 
the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of Mohammed, are opposed to political succession based 
on Mohammed’s bloodline.There are divisions even over the precepts of Islam, but the 
main difference relates to authority, which sparked the political split in the seventh 
century and evolved into divergent interpretations of sharia, or Islamic law, and distinct 
sectarian identities. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015) 
Shias believe that God always provides a guide, first the Imams and then ayatollahs, or 
experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative authority and are sought as a 
source of emulation. The term “ayatollah” is associated with the clerical rulers in 
Tehran, but it’s primarily a title for a distinguished religious leader known as a marja, or 
source of emulation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was appointed by an elected 
body of Iranian clerics, while maraji (plural of marja) are elevated through the religious 
schools in Qom, Najaf, and Karbala. Shias can choose from dozens of maraji, most of 
whom are based in holy cities in Iraq and Iran. Many Shias emulate a marja for religious 
affairs and defer to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran for political guidance. For 
Sunnis, authority is based on the Quran and the traditions of Mohammed. Sunni 
religious scholars, who are constrained by legal precedents, exert far less authority over 
their followers than their Shia counterparts. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015) 
Both sects have subdivisions. Four schools comprise Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, 
Maliki, and Hanbali, the latter spawning the Wahhabi and Salafi movements in Saudi 
Arabia. Sunnism, a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Islam, is united on the importance 
of the Quran and practice of Mohammed but allows for differences in legal opinion.” 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2015) 
This Sunni-Shia divide have fueled the use of hate speech and propaganda between the 
followers of the two main branches of Islam, thus inflaming feelings and pitting Sunnis against 
Shias, widening the gap between the two branches of Islam and strengthening radical groups 
like ISIS: 
Sectarian rhetoric dehumanizing the “other” is centuries old. But the volume is 
increasing. Dismissing Arab Shias as Safawis, a term that paints them as Iranian agents 
(from the Safavid empire) and hence traitors to the Arab cause, is increasingly common 
in Sunni rhetoric. Hard-line Sunni Islamists have used harsher historic terms such 
as rafidha, rejecters of the faith, and majus, Zoroastrian or crypto Persian, to describe 
Shias. Iranian officials, Iraq’s prime minister, and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of 
Hezbollah, routinely describe their Sunni opponents as takfiris (code for al-Qaeda 
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terrorists) and Wahhabis. This cycle of demonization has been exacerbated throughout 
the Muslim world.”  (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015) 
 
Is it all really a Shia-Sunni conflict that empowers ISIS? 
 
Understanding the historic/religious origin of the split between Sunnis and Shias offer very little 
light to understand the conflict in the Middle East and the rise of ISIS, for example, portraying 
ISIS as a Sunni group fighting the Shia government/militias in Iraq and Syria, will fall very short 
on explaining the Sunni-Sunni conflict and inner fighting, even between two radical Sunni 
groups like ISIS and Al-Qaida, who share the same radical Salafi-Sunni ideological background, 
but didn’t prevent them from fighting each other and calling each other Kuffar (Infidels), this 
fact makes it very obvious that labeling the conflict in the Middle East as Sunni vs. Shia is only 
the first layer in understanding the complexity of the rise of ISIS: 
“The current confrontation has an important sectarian element, but it cannot be 
accurately understood simply as a “Sunni versus Shia” fight. Applying such a framework 
can distort analytical focus, oversimplify regional dynamics, and cause Iran and Saudi 
Arabia’s motives to be misunderstood. Riyadh and Tehran are playing a balance of 
power game. They are using sectarianism in that game, but both have crossed the 
sectarian fault line in seeking regional allies. (Gause, 2014, p.1) 
The regional cold war can only be understood by appreciating the links between 
domestic conflicts, transnational affinities, and regional state ambitions. It is the 
weakening of Arab states, more than sectarianism or the rise of Islamist ideologies, that 
has created the battlefields of the new Middle East cold war. Indeed, it is the arc of 
state weakness and state failure running from Lebanon through Syria to Iraq that 
explains the current salience of sectarianism” (Gause, 2014, p.1) 
 
The weakening of the states in the Middle East is the core factor that lead to the rise of ISIS.  
The weakening of a state like Iraq put it under the mercy of stronger regional power (Iran) 
which started not only interfering in domestic politics, but actively control this weak state, 
through Shia militias that directly answer to Iran which in turn legitimized the role of ISIS as a 
guardian of Sunni population and identity.  
Although, it is the Sunni-Sunni conflict what really reveals that the conflict in the Middle East 
and the rise of ISIS is not about ideology as much as it is about restoring order and power to 
those who lost it.  
The Sunni-Sunni conflict is not about ideology in its core –since conflicting factions follow the 
same school of thought-, but rather about the title of leadership of the Sunnis in the region to 
fill the gap of power left by the weak states in the Middle East. 
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ISIS solidifies its “Caliphate1” by claiming the title of “Sunni Leadership”: 
 
The title of “Sunni Leadership” is something very important for ISIS to claim in order to 
legitimize their state or their Caliphate, because there could only be one Caliph(Successor of 
the prophet Mohamad in leading Muslims), hence only one true Islamic state in which the 
“Saved Group” inhabit. 
The “Saved Group” is thought to be the one chosen group that will lead Muslims into the final 
battle in Dabiq-Syria near Aleppo, ushering the end of days and the second coming: 
“The basis of ISIS’s contention for being the center for Salafi religiosity today revolves 
around the Prophetic Hadith referred to as the “Delivered Group” Hadith, which 
stipulates that there is only one group of Muslims that will be “delivered” in the end of 
days and ascend to heaven. This Hadith is held to be true by every notable Islamic 
faction, which are basically competing for the title of “Delivered Group”.” (Crimmins, 
Hamoud, 2015) 
ISIS –who is a radical Sunni-Salafi group- follows the strict teachings of clerk Mohamad Ibn 
Abdul Wahab2, who allied with the house of Saud back in the 17th century to spread his strict 
interpretation of Islam for the purpose of “reforming Islam” because according to Ibn 
Ghannam, the companion of Abdul Wahab’s and the author of his autobiography titled “The 
history of Nagd”, most Muslims were engaged in idle worshiping and heretic/Infidel like 
behavior all over the Muslim world.  
Mohamd Ibn Albdul Wahab the founder of Wahhabism, sent several envoys all over the Arabic 
peninsula calling people to join his movement. 
He stated in a letter sent to the people of Qassim –a region in modern day Saudi Arabia- when 
they asked him about his creed, that he follows the creed of the “Delivered Group”  
 
In order to claim the title of leadership, and hence attract followers to it, ISIS set out to 
delegitimize the role of Saudi Arabia as the biggest Sunni power in the region, by issuing many 
videos containing speeches and testimonies revealing the “Hypocrisy” of the Saudi State, it’s 
clerks and rulers, furthermore in an ISIS publication, published by the media office in Wylayat 
(state) Salah Al-Din titled “Say I’m aware of my lord”, one of the speakers accused Saudi Arabia 
of not applying the teachings of clerk Mohamd Ibn Abdul Wahab, he continued on saying that 
this is manifested in having American military bases on its soil and dealing in usury in its banks 
and many other reasons. 
 
                                                          
1 A caliphate (Arabic: ةفلاِخ khilāfa) is a form of Islamic government led by a caliph (Arabic: ةفيلَخ khalīfah 
pronunciation—a person considered a political and religious successor to the Islamic prophet, Muhammad 
(Muhammad ibn ʿAbdullāh), and a leader of the entire Muslim community. 
2 Please look in the next section: “Who is ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)?” to read more about Mohamad 
Ibn AbdulWahab. 
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 ISIS on the other hand set out to to provide physical benefits to the Sunnis and proclaiming 
itself as the guardian of their identity by achieving religious legitimacy. 
“LAITH KUBBA, Fmr. Iraq Government Spokesman: By declaring the Khalifah, they did 
something nobody else has done. 
The implication of this in the minds of the traditional Salafi believers is that they have a 
religious obligation to pledge loyalty. 
Due to their faith in that particular sect, they have an obligation to respond to a caliph if 
he calls them. Now, I know not all Salafis will do that. But even if 1 percent of the Salafis 
do that, you’re talking about tens of thousands of people now in Nigeria, in Saudi 
Arabia, in Jordan, in every Muslim country, Sunni country.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
ISIS is so far successful in promoting itself as a leader of the Sunnis, by fighting other Sunni 
factions and revealing their “hypocrisy” for dealing with the West –especially the Saudi regime-, 
and also by establishing the caliphate which the “promise of Allah” as ISIS puts it, which is the 
mean to restore the Sunni lost pride and jeopardized identity, and thus ISIS is able to amass 
public support, volunteers and recruits. 
“Caliphate, establishment, and safety – a promise from Allah reserved for the Muslims, 
but with a condition. {They worship me [Allah] and do not associate anything with me} 
[An-Nūr: 55]. 
For by fulfilling this condition comes the ability to build, reform, remove oppression, 
spread justice, and bring about safety and tranquility. Only by meeting this condition, 
will there be the Caliphate, which Allah informed the angels about.” 
(Abū Muḥammad Al-ʿAdnānī Ash-Shāmī, 2014) 
The title of Sunni leadership offers a great prestige and status that is essential to establishing 
religious legitimacy of the caliphate which will be very important to attracting recruits. 
This point is very clear to the Saudis who are the main competitors to ISIS on the title of Sunni 
leadership. 
The Saudis realize the threat to their state’s legitimacy and their control over the area if ISIS 
was to succeed in their effort, and hence on the 17th of December 2015 the Saudis established a 
Sunni/Muslim alliance to fight ISIS containing 34 Muslim state. 
 
Finally, it is true that ISIS sees that announcing the caliphate is a religious obligation, but it 
should not be looked at and analyzed as merely a religiously motivated move, it’s also a strong 
and radical, political reaction from the marginalized and disfranchised Sunnis, who long for the 
stability and security of strong central rule that they can identify with, a rule that will stand up 
to their rights and defend them against all regional forces who wants to manipulate them for 
their own interest, a type of rule they lost after the American invasion of Iraq. 
 
Who is ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)? 
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It is imperative for us to point that ISIS is in no way a representative of Islam, and that this 
paper is in no way attempting to create a link between the two, we are merely trying to 
understand whether or not the radical religious context of ISIS is playing a role in attracting 
people to join its ranks, furthermore we think that overlooking or neglecting the religious 
aspect of ISIS –which ISIS themselves identify themselves to be so- will render us unable to 
understand the reasons behind its emergence and empowerment, for these reasons we will be 
studying ISIS as a radical Sunni-Salafi group. 
 
So who is ISIS, and what’s their interpretation of their brand of Salafi-Sunni Islam?  
And does their radical ideology play a role in attracting people to it? Or is it its political program 
that included establishing the caliphate, this political program that came with the promise of a 
stable state that preserves the identity and the dignity of Sunni-Muslims in region that has been 
plagued with instability after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 which paved the way for a 
Shia/Iranian hegemony over a mainly Sunni/Arab region? Or is it all of the above? Or is it other 
reasons? 
 
ISIS is a radical Sunni group, it follows the Salafi school of thought, it preaches and teaches the 
teachings of Clerk Mohamad Ibn-Abdul Wahab works like “Kitab Al Tawheed” and “Ten Things 
That Nullify One’s Islam” 
Some of the key elements in the ISIS educational programs are similar to what one finds in 
Saudi textbooks, especially those that are taught in Saudi public middle and high schools. The 
ideological foundations of Saudi public school education are based on Wahhabi-Salafi-Hanbali 
theology (Nakhleh, 2014).  
The Salafi School, takes a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad 
and his earliest followers—al-salaf al-salih, the “pious forefathers”— right down to their facial 
hair.  
They reject religious innovation, or bida3, and support the implementation of sharia (Islamic 
law). (The Economist, 2015) 
Wahhabism is an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran. Strict 
Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and 
enemies. Critics say that Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, 
pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 The official spokesperson of ISIS Abū Muḥammad Al-ʿAdnani offers a better understanding of 
ISIS’s ideology: 
                                                          
3 In Islam, Bid'ah (Arabic: ةعدب) refers to any innovations in religious matters. Linguistically the 
term means "innovation, novelty, heretical doctrine, heresy". In contrast to the English term "innovation", the 
word bid'ah in Arabic generally carries a negative connotation. 
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“It is not for the State (ISIS) to follow the people; if they are to do good, then good shall 
be done, and if they are to do evil then so it shall be done. The Manhaj4 of the State will 
remain: disbelieving in the Ṭāghūt5, declaring innocence from him and his supporters 
and fighting them with swords and spearheads, and with conclusive argumentation and 
evidence. So whoever agrees with it, it welcomes them, and whoever differs with it, it 
will give him no concern even if he were to call himself ‘the Ummah6’, even if it were left 
alone in a tent and the world is in another tent. 
(Abū Muḥammad Al-ʿAdnānī Ash-Shāmī, 2014) 
 
So after introducing the political environment in which groups like ISIS can grow in and 
describing what ISIS is as a religious but politically motivated group, we will start taking a look 
into the people joining this group and seeing what are the reasons that drive people to join this 
particular group rather than all the other ones, and how it’s support grew in record time to 
becoming one of the most powerful terrorist group in history. 
What is the background of the people who join terrorist organizations?  
In order to understand the oppression of Sunnis we need to know about their background. Are 
they feeling isolated from the rest of the population? Because there are no studies of Isis 
members` backgrounds since it is still a pretty new organization, we used Marc Sageman`s and 
Rik Coolsaet`s studies to get information about global salafi jihadists and people who have been 
involved in jihadi terrorism in Europe. “Since 9/11 Sageman has assembled data on hundreds of 
jihadi terrorists around the world and reported these findings in his book Understanding Terror 
Networks (2004).” (FRONTLINE 2005) We use his study Understanding terror networks to 
understand more of the backgrounds of global salafi jihadists. “Rik Coolsaet is Professor of 
International Relations at Ghent University (Belgium). He is Chair of the Department of Political 
Science at Ghent University and Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute (Royal Institute 
for International Relations) in Brussels. ” (EGMONET Royal Institute for International Relations) 
We use also his background study of European terrorists to create a link between examples to 
Isis members who might share a similar background. Even though the studies are an overall 
studies about global Salafi jihadists and European fighters’ background we want to know the 
possible circumstances and motivations which lead people to become radicalized. Later we also 
                                                          
4 Manhaj (Arabic: جاهنملاو) refers to the methodology of receiving, analyzing and applying knowledge. So, if you go 
by the correct understanding of the Quran and Sunnah then you are on the correct Manhaj. The correct 
understanding of the Quran and Sunnah is that of the righteous predecessors. It refers to the specific way and 
methodology adopted by Ahl us-Sunnah (Sunnis), which is derived from the Book and the Sunnah, upon the 
understanding of the Salaf, in the various affairs of the religion, be they related to beliefs, or other aspects of 
knowledge, or aspects of action. 
5 In Islamic theology, the word refers to idolatry or to worship anything except Allah. This includes living under 
secular rule or semi-secular rule or governing through institutions that uses anything but Sharia Islamic rule “the 
rule of Allah” as the one and only source for legislation and governing. 
6 The whole community of Muslims bound together by ties of religion.  
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introduce Annika Waldeck`s study, which examines different motivations of Europeans to join 
Isis as a foreign fighter. 
Indoctrination of young Sunni-Muslims: 
The number of foreign fighters combating in the Middle East is increasing. According to United 
Kingdom government reports the estimate of foreign fighters, from Western Europe, is now up 
till 18% in Syria. Many of those foreign fighters will join Islamic state.  
This chapter later in this paper will shed light on how Islamic state is indoctrinating people, 
mainly young Sunni Muslims, to follow their cause of extreme jihad. This chapter will also 
discover how Islamic state is using mind control/brainwash in the recruiting of young people. 
Furthermore, it will be revealed how mind control/brainwash/recruiting is a part of the 
masterplan to consolidate their power in the Middle East. 
This knowledge will be achieved through a wide range of sources, like: a recently translated 
Islamic state blue print, a case from the Middle East, an interview with psychology professor 
Steven Hassan and United Kingdom government statistics over foreign fighters.  
 
Problem area, research question and choice of theory: 
The problem area that we will be discussing is ISIS’s ability to recruit and gain more strength 
after being decimated by the end of 2011. 
So our main research question will be:  
 
What role does the recent disfranchisement of the Sunnis play in ISIS’s rise to 
power? 
 
We will also shed light in a later chapter on the following sub questions:  
--How does Islamic state indoctrinate people, as a part of the recruitment process, to 
fight their cause? 
--What methods are they using, and how is this a part of their masterplan? 
 
Our choice of theory will be:  
The theory of F. Gregory Gause, III. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold 
War. 
We will use this theory to help us understand the regional context in which ISIS exist in, where 
regional forces attempt to take advantage of the power vacuum that exists in the region which 
was cause by the American invasion of Iraq and then the Arab Spring. 
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These regional powers (especially Iran) in their attempt to dominate the region through 
supporting sometimes governments and sometimes non-government actors, created a sense of 
injustice and in fact disfranchised a significant portion of the population which empowered 
ISIS’s radical ideology and approach. 
 
We see that it is important in order to understand ISIS and its strength, one needs to 
understand the conflict that created it, this is why, even though we will be mainly focusing on 
the middle East, we will also be looking into the backgrounds and recruitments in different 
countries around the world, since ISIS as an organization is an Arabic-Sunni organization, but 
the people who join it are not all as such. 
The global identity of ISIS is no doubt a reflection of the global/regional conflict that created it 
and hence the conflict that created ISIS is better described as a regional cold war: 
“Axes of conflict in cold wars are never simply bilateral, and the same is true of the new 
Middle East cold war. The Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional allies, al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, the emergent Islamic State, and other Sunni groups are locked 
in a conflict over what the proper political role of Islam should be in the Sunni world. 
A final aspect of the new Middle East cold war is the paradox of power. A state’s own 
military power is not a particularly useful tool. Instead, the key is to be able to support 
non-state actors effectively in their domestic political battles within the weak states of 
the Arab world. Effective patronage of regional allies requires transnational ideological 
and political connections that make potential clients open to a relationship with the 
patron. That is why Israel and Turkey have not been able to play very effectively in the 
cold war, while Qatar has had an outsized influence. 
The new Middle East cold war goes beyond the Arab world. Iran is a major protagonist. 
Turkey has made a bid for a greater regional role. It is not an ideological battle of 
“progressives” versus “reactionaries.” The line-ups are less ideological and more 
identity-based.” (Gause, 2014, p3.p4) 
 
Prime minster Maliki paving the way towards an ISIS resurrection: 
 
Who is Nouri Al-Maliki? 
Al-Maliki is a Shia, he joined Al-Dawa Party in 1968, passing through the rest of the stations 
until the arrival to power in Iraq in 2006, and becoming the party leader from 2007 to 2014, 
when he stepped down as a prime minster as well. 
Al-Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are two of the main parties in the religious-Shia 
United Iraqi Alliance, which won a plurality of seats in both the provisional January 2005 Iraqi 
election and the longer-term December 2005 election. 
The Iraqi Al-Dawa –along with the Supreme Iraqi Council- party fought on the side of Shia Iran 
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in the Iraq-Iran war which lasted from 1980 to 1988. 
 
In one of Al-Jazeera’s episodes of the series-documentaries titled “Black Box”, the episode 
talked about the history of Maliki, who was in the jihadist Committee of the Dawa party, which 
planned to hit the interests of the Iraqi regime at home and abroad at the time of the Iran-Iraq 
war.  
Al-Jazeera also reviewed several tasks carried out by the party; including the bombing of the 
Iraqi embassy in Beirut, and other operations from the early eighties.  
The documentary also showed leaked documents from Al-Maliki’s office himself, after he 
assumed power in 2006 baring his signature most of those documents related to the security 
aspect, which documented serious security violations and abuses which occurred on his watch, 
including the establishment of secret prisons, torture and identity-based murders of Sunnis, 
and extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, which were classified as crimes against 
humanity. (Al-Jazeera, 2015) 
The Leaked documents obtained by WikiLeaks and broadcast on Al Jazeera showed that the 
former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki cooperated with Israeli intelligence services and 
Iran in order to obtain intelligence that lead to the assassination of hundreds of Sunni Iraqi 
scholars. 
The assassinations targeted hundreds of Iraqi scholars working in different fields, including 
nuclear studies, as well as pilots. (Al-Jazeera, 2015) 
 
Al Jazeera broadcasted a full investigative documentary, which included the details of the 
assassination of 350 Iraqi nuclear scholars and 80 pilots. 
In one of the documents, Al-Maliki requests private information about Iraqi scholars and how to 
reach and liquidate them. This document was handed over to Mossad and Iran. 
Another document dating back to 2007, leaked from Al-Maliki’s office and signed with his 
name, reveals direct coordination between the Iraqi government and the Iranian revolution 
guards to liquidate Iraqi individuals, especially MPs. (Al-Jazeera, 2015) 
“DEXTER FILKINS, Author, The Forever War: The thing to understand about Maliki is, is 
that when he looks at Iraq’s Sunni minority, he sees, you know, al Qaeda. He sees the 
Ba’athists. He sees military coups. He sees plots against him. He sees a population which 
despises him and wants to come back into power. 
LEON PANETTA, Secretary of Defense, 2011-13: He (Al-Maliki) had a deep fear that, 
ultimately, the Ba’athists were going to go after him and that he was going to be 
targeted and that he would lose power, and it would be the ghost of Saddam Hussein 
again. I think that’s what he worried about.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
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Deepening the sectarian divide in order to solidify Iranian/Shia hegemony over 
Iraq: 
In 2011 Maliki’s paranoia of the Sunnis, drove him to dismantle the fragile alliances that was set 
up by the Americans before their departure: 
“Maliki also enraged the tribesmen of the “Sunni awakening.” These were the tribesmen 
who, in exchange for American money and promises of political inclusion in a new Iraq, 
had helped defeat al Qaeda years earlier. 
DAVID KILCULLEN, U.S. Military Advisor, 2005-11: And then the other key thing was 
that Sunni leaders in the army and Sunni leaders in the police began to be sidelined, and 
people with a strong Shia sectarian bent replaced them. And that meant that a lot of 
people felt they were being excluded. And that was true, they were.”  
(FRONTLINE, 2014) 
In 2011 ISIS was dismasted in Iraq by the “Awakening” of Sunni Iraqis who joined the fight 
against the extremists, but the actions of Nouri Al-Maliki against the Sunnis was rapidly paving 
the way for its return…with a vengeance! 
What remained of ISIS were the most battle-hardened al Qaeda militants, a few embittered 
tribesmen, and some remnants of Saddam’s Ba’athist military hoping to regain power. 
Those will later become the core command of ISIS. 
“From Iraq into Syria, al Qaeda was looking increasingly like a spent force. Osama bin 
Laden had been killed a few months earlier. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had bin 
Laden’s passion but little of his charisma, and the Middle East was still in the throes of 
the so-called Arab Spring, experimenting with peaceful protests rather than violence as 
a means to bring about change.” (ABOUZEID, 2014) 
Al-Adnani (ISIS’s spokesperson) himself spoke about how dire the situation was for ISIS and how 
their leaderships and strength were exhausted. 
The actions of the sectarian Iraqi government and more specifically Nouri Al-Maliki, re-
invigorated the exhausted radical group and it all started after the American withdrawal from 
Iraq, when Maliki started to have a free regain over Iraq and its Sunni population: 
“It was late 2011 when American troops finally left Iraq. Iraq’s leaders said they were 
ready to go it alone. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki flew to Washington to mark the 
occasion. 
What happened was that while he was in Washington, Maliki received a phone call from 
Baghdad about a terrorist plot implicating his vice president, Tareq al Hashemi, the most 
senior Sunni politician in the Shia-led government. It accused Hashemi’s bodyguards of 
planning an attack on Shia targets. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
VALI NASR, Dean, Johns Hopkins, Adv. Intl. Studies: The response he (Maliki) got from 
the president (Obama) was that this is an internal Iraqi affair. And that, to Maliki, was a 
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green light in terms of what he can do with the Sunnis because the United States is not 
going to stand in his way.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
Maliki returned to Baghdad. And then, just one day after the last American soldiers left Iraq he 
ordered the arrest of Hashemi’s arrest, but before he could be arrested, Hashimi fled the 
country. Hashemi and his bodyguards would just be Maliki’s first targets.  
In 2012, thousands of Sunnis suspected of subversion were held for months or longer without 
charges ever being filed. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
And then the brutality agonist Sunnis really started taking hold, what started off with rounding 
up of Sunnis linked to radical groups and “terrorists” became systematic and arbitrary targeting 
of Sunnis everywhere, by the radical Shia militias: 
“RICHARD BARRETT, Former British Intelligence Officer: The Shia militia were very, very 
violent. There were many, many instances in Baghdad, and in many other parts of Iraq, 
of Sunnis turning up with a bullet in the back of their head and their hands bound 
behind them. This was common. This was a daily, daily occurrence.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
Weak Iraqi state and strong Iranian militias: 
So here we see how the Iraqi state that was weakened by the American invasion, left that 
country an easy prey for regional powers to manipulate it and eventually this weak state, 
enabled Iran to install a government that is loyal to Tehran, and in order to maintain that 
hegemony over Iraq, it was in Iran’s interest to deepen the sectarian divide leaving the Iraqi 
central government weak and depended on the Shia militias for protection. 
These militias are financed by Iran, and answer directly to Iran and composes the bulk of Iraqi 
army and security forces. 
 
A reportage done by France24 showed a commander in one of the Shia militias called Kataib al-
Imam Ali, this militia is a part of the Popular Mobilization Forces that is fighting ISIS in Iraq, the 
commander’s name is Abu Azrael and he has become a social media sensation shooting many 
videos posted on YouTube with him fighting ISIS and training other Shia militias:    
“These militias (Shia militias) obey Iranian religious leaders more than their own 
government. 
Abu Azrael says he is ready to pursue his war beyond the borders of Iraq. 
Abu Azrael, Commander in the Shia militia Kataib al-Imam Ali: If the Marja (religious 
leader in Iran) tells us to march on Saudi Arabia or Mecca, we will go. If we have to go to 
help our Houthi brothers (In Yemen), we will go. All we ask for is to fall as martyrs, and 
have a decent death at the end as martyrs or win.” (France 24 English, 2015) 
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The start of the Anbar protests: 
“Maliki’s purges of Sunnis continued. And Maliki upped the ante in December 2012, 
when his police rounded up the bodyguards of another prominent Sunni leader, Finance 
Minister Rafi al Essawi. 
RAFI AL ESSAWI: Hundreds of thousands of people were very upset because they feel 
that this is a story of dignity. No Sunni is exempted. People started to prepare for a big 
demonstration in Fallujah and Ramadi. So I called them. I said to them, “I’ll join the 
demonstration. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
As weeks went by, the demonstrations grew. In Ramadi, protesters camped out on the 
main road between Baghdad and Jordan, a vital trucking artery. In other Sunni cities and 
towns—Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit—other protests halted traffic and commerce. 
With youth unemployment running as high as 40 percent, young men were free to 
gather. And support poured in from around the Sunni Arab world to pay for tents, meals 
and transportation.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
The protests continued and the main reasons for these protests, were the marginalization of 
Sunnis, Corruption, Unemployment, Poor national security, Poor public services, Unfair 
imprisoning of thousands of Sunnis, the marginalization and poor treatment of the Sunni 
awakening militias, and most importantly the Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. 
 
How did different actors react to what the Iraqi government was doing to the 
Sunnis? 
“Officials in the White House saw what was happening. Obama’s ambassador to Iraq 
had warned that Maliki needed to be contained. 
JAMES JEFFREY, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 2010-12: This was a constant warning that I 
had made and that others had made before me, that Maliki was a problem. On the 
other hand, the president and the country had taken the position Iraq was a mistake, 
we’ve ended our war in Iraq. If we see things we don’t like, we’ll do calls from the vice 
president, just like we do with 150 other countries that have similar situations. 
(FRONTLINE, 2014) 
KEN POLLACK, Brookings Institution: The Obama Administration certainly did tell Prime 
Minister Maliki and other Iraqis that they wanted to see them play by the democratic 
rules, that they thought it was a mistake for them to go after their political rivals in this 
fashion. But they did it in private. They didn’t do it in public. And they certainly never 
imposed any kind of a cost.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
ISIS saw the actions of the Shia government of Iraq and the international passiveness about 
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what was being done to the Sunnis as an opportunity to emerge as a savior and a protector of 
the Sunnis in Iraq: 
“The daily numbers of Sunni detainees before the alleged withdrawal treaty of the 
crusader occupation could be counted on fingers, but now, under the safawis7 
occupation it is in the hundreds, and they only target Sunnis amongst all others, the 
Sunni that manages to get away from terrorism and jihad accusations, gets imprisoned 
for being a Ba’athist or corrupted. 
There are a hundred detainees in one day in Abu ghraib, another day there are two 
hundreds, in Al-Jamia’a neighborhood in Baghdad there are 80 detainees in one day, 
not a day passes in Diala without tens of Sunnis being detained, meanwhile in Nainawa 
and Salah Al-Din the detentions are endless, these numbers and locations are only few. 
After all of these crimes of the Rafida (rejecters of the faith/Shia), their mindless war on 
the Sunnis, and their daily plotting against us, how could anyone come and deny our 
retaliation on them and condemn us for deterring them?” (Abu Mohamad Al-Adnani, 
2012) 
 
ISIS takes advantage of the Syrian weak state to gain more traction: 
 
The upheaval and chaos created by the Arabic spring in the Arabic world knocked the door of 
Syria in the beginning of 2011, and it wasn’t long until ISIS realized that the weakening of the 
Syrian state it is the golden opportunity they could have only dreamed of: 
“Syrian emissary from the al Qaeda affiliate forged in the bloody conflict next door. He 
called himself Abu Mohammad al-Golani, and the young fighter, about whom little is 
known for sure except that he is a veteran of that war against the Americans in Iraq, had 
been authorized by his boss, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and al Qaeda’s central command to 
set up a Syrian offshoot of the notorious group. His mission, made clear in subsequent 
public statements, was nothing less than to bring down the Assad regime and establish 
an Islamic state in its place.” (ABOUZEID, 2014) 
Al-Qaida started attacking vital Syrian positions and soon gained a reputation of being full of 
extraordinary fighters with unwavering moral and extensive experience and ability to document 
and videotape their operations -which is something they learned in Iraq- all of this made them 
gain not only local Syrian support, but regional money started pouring in as well: 
“In Syria, al Qaeda was steadily gaining ground. In its early months, the group relied on 
donations from wealthy Sunnis in the region. 
KEN POLLACK, Brookings Institution: The Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Emiratis, all of the 
Gulf States and a whole variety of other countries began to provide support to a whole 
                                                          
7 A term that paints them as Iranian agents (from the Safavid empire) and hence traitors to the Arab cause. 
20 
 
variety of Sunni opposition groups. And they weren’t terribly careful about which groups 
got the aid. 
And soon al Qaeda would need fewer donations. As they gained territory, they would 
become more self-sustaining, robbing banks, running extortion rackets, seizing Syrian 
transportation routes and eventually Syrian oil fields.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
The instability in Syria caused by the events of the Arab Spring, the money that was pouring in 
to Al-Qaida from regional actors interested in advancing their interests, the lack of support to 
the pro-western rebels and the experience that distinguished Al-Qaida from all other factions in 
Syria in the matters of running and controlling infrastructure, all of these factors further made 
Al-qaida the most powerful faction in Syria and further weakened the Syrian state: 
“U.S. ambassador to Syria Robert Ford had urged the administration to quickly provide 
aid to pro-Western Syrian rebels. Otherwise, he warned, al Qaeda would dominate. 
ROBERT FORD, U.S. Ambassador to Syria, 2010-14: I think there was certainly warnings 
from people at my level that in a large, ungoverned space, having al Qaeda or al Qaeda-
affiliated groups able to operate freely would be as much a risk to the United States as 
Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan were. And in each of those places, the Americans had 
to act. 
But in Syria, the president chose not to send arms.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
The importance of ISIS moving into Syria was manifested in its ability to gain extraordinary 
power, finances and ability to recruit by validating its speech, that what is happening is a war 
between the Shia lead by Iran and the oppressed Sunnis all over the region, and that enabled it 
to plan for going back to Iraq with a vengeance. 
Going back to Iraq with a vengeance: 
“Throughout 2012, the president (Obama) held off. Without U.S. arms, the more 
moderate Syrian rebels struggled. Al Qaeda, meanwhile, was ready to expand back into 
Iraq. In a campaign called “breaking the walls,” they launched a series of attacks on Iraqi 
prisons. Al Qaeda’s ranks swelled with newly freed inmates. 
Then in March 2013, a few of al Qaeda’s black flags began to appear in the midst of the 
protests in Ramadi. And around this time, they started calling themselves the Islamic 
State in Iraq and al Sham—ISIS. Their presence stoked Maliki’s worst fears.” 
(FRONTLINE, 2014) 
When the black flags of Al-Qaida started appearing in the Anbar demonstrations, is when 
Maliki’s attitude towards the demonstrations changed drastically, Maliki brought in the army 
and the security forces and cracked down on the Sunni protestors, who have been protesting 
peacefully for months, his weak state’s institutions could not absorb the demands for reform 
and change, and now he deemed the threat of these demonstrations to be an existentialist 
threat for him and his government, so he responded with brutal force: 
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“DEXTER FILKINS, The New Yorker: The facts were a little unclear. You have some 
provocateurs. There’s a police officer who’s—who’s killed, maybe by al Qaeda, maybe 
not. And Maliki responds massively and with enormous force. 
It’s unclear how many people were killed. The estimates that I’ve heard from people 
who saw the bodies was that there were hundreds, hundreds and hundreds of bodies.” 
(FRONTLINE, 2014) 
This is when ISIS stepped up and said, that peaceful ways does not work, change can only be 
done with violence, and that brutal violence could only be faced with brutal violence and 
people started listening and subscribing to that notion, especially after trying all the other 
methods for change and failing miserably: 
 
“You should know O’ revolting Sunnis everywhere that our disease is not the ruling 
regimes, but rather the infidel laws in which they rule. There is no difference between 
one ruler or another if we don’t change the ruling systems.  
There is no difference between Mubarak or Moaamar or Ibn Ali, between Morsi, Aboudl 
Jalil or Al-ghanoushei. They are all taghout ruling with the same system. 
This is our disease, and the source of our disgrace is our leaning towards soft living and 
abandoning the Jihad. So if we want to lift injustice and gain back pride, we must 
renounce the secular polytheistic laws and arbitrate the rule of Allah, and there is no 
way into that but the Jihad” (Abu Mohamad Al-Adnani, 2013) 
 
Violence work! ISIS takes charge back in Iraq: 
 
“So these are people, young men, who sat in those protests in Ramadi and Hawijah who 
decided to take up weapons and join with ISIS? 
ALI KHEDERY, Sr. Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, 2003-09: They tried to—they voted 
for a new government in Baghdad in 2010. Their representatives, like Hashemi and 
Issawi, fellow Sunni Arabs, were purged. They were humiliated. They tried to form a 
region. They tried to exercise civil disobedience. They were attacked with Maliki’s 
forces. And so now they’ve taken up arms. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
DEXTER FILKINS, The New Yorker: If you take Iraq’s Sunni community, its leadership, it’s 
full of reasonable people. It’s full of secular, educated, very moderate people. But they 
look around and they say, “Where do we go? The only people that are going to protect 
us are these really hard guys. We may not like them, but we need them because 
otherwise, there’s nothing. Nobody’s going to protect us. And the Americans aren’t here 
anymore. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
Three months after Hawijah, ISIS mounted a spectacular attack right on the outskirts of 
Baghdad, releasing more than 500 inmates from Abu Ghraib prison. 
NED PARKER, Reuters, Baghdad Bureau Chief: It was a huge propaganda win for the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. It was basically—the prison bust-out was a statement of 
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purpose that, “We’re here. What started after Hawijah, in terms of the bombings, the 
spike in violence, we’re orchestrating this. And hell is coming.” (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
ISIS began bringing more reinforcements over the Syrian border. It became clear that 
the Iraqi army could not stop their advance. 
In December 2013, Maliki would strike once again, this time against a hard-line Sunni 
parliamentarian, Ahmed al Alwani. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
After that arrest, Maliki sent the army into Ramadi to tear down the year-old protest 
camp. Maliki’s move would prove disastrous. 
NED PARKER, Reuters, Baghdad Bureau Chief: And the Islamic State takes advantage of 
that to move inside these cities. And from there, you have chapter one of the Iraq War 
of 2014 begin. The fighting lasted only a few days. In the end, the Iraqi army was no 
match. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
Then on June 6th, 2014, ISIS sent several suicide car bombs into downtown Mosul, along 
with ISIS fighters in pickup trucks. In some neighborhoods, they were warmly welcomed. 
The Iraqi army, on the other hand, was seen as a Shia militia. With no local support, the 
army had deserted by June 10th with barely a fight. 
In the end, it took only 800 ISIS militants, with the help of local Ba’athist military cadres, 
to secure a city of 1.8 million people. Even ISIS was surprised. 
From Mosul, ISIS rapidly advanced down the Tigris and captured Qayyarah, al Shirqat, 
Hawijah and Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein. (FRONTLINE, 2014) 
 
 
Who joins ISIS in Iraq? 
 
We must point out that a lot of people don’t join ISIS for its ideological reasons since there are 
many fighters join it for various other reasons, Othman Al Mukhtar (is the Baghdad Bureau 
Chief for Al Araby Al Jadeed) says in a seminar organized by the Arab Center for research and 
policy studies: 
“We have to understand that there is a difference between ISIS-Syria and ISIS-Iraq, there 
are two wings to ISIS.  
ISIS in Iraq is divided into three groups, -and I’m talking from this research standpoint- 
we have: 
The fighters or the Mujahedeen: Who have the ideology and the objectives of ISIS, this 
group are ISIS par excellence, they believe in what they are doing and these people have 
been made by Al-Qaida. 
They are Salafi/Jihadi from the Jihadi/Salafi faction, they have been influenced by 
Abdullah Azzam or the school of Al-Zarkawi…ect. 
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This group in ISIS is the leadership of ISIS, it constitutes 30% to 35% of the body of ISIS, 
most of them are very much known leaders of ISIS, they are Arabs and Europeans, most 
of them are not Iraqis. This groups is the backbone of ISIS. 
The second group is the Oppressed: According to a report that was leaked by the Iraqi 
Intelligence services in 28-9-2014, this report was aimed towards the Iraqi Parliament 
and in a edited edition to the American Embassy in Baghdad, it stated that last February 
of 2014 had only 3000 among whom 200 Arabic fighters, the report adds that the 
estimated number of ISIS’s troops in 28-9-2014 is more than 40 000 fighters in Iraq only. 
The reports affirms that the fighters who recently joined ISIS, could be reason with and 
reach an agreement with. 
This is a governmental acknowledgment of causing ISIS to grow due to their practices. 
this second group is the biggest group, they are mostly ex-detainees in the Iraqi prisons 
from 2003 till now, they are victims of sectarian violence, and they are those who were 
crushed by the systematic ethnic and sectarian marginalization which was carried out by 
Prime Minster Nouri Al-Maliki throughout the last 8 years, where he turned the “Sunnis 
of Iraq” into second class citizens, and here I’m talking about more than 13 million Iraqi 
Sunnis. 
This second group is the biggest group, it’s a group feeding off hatred, vengeance and a 
desire for retribution. 
This group wants to get back from those who hurt them and marginalized them in the 
past years. 
This group can be reasoned with, we can open a dialogue with this group.  
This group is distinct by its fierce and seasoned fighters. This group is described to be 
the “infants” of ISIS, since they are new to joining the organization, the vast majority 
joined no longer than 9 months ago. 
This group believe in continuing to fight, but they don’t believe in the Caliphate. 
They don’t believe in the ideologically of ISIS like carrying out suicide attacks, but the 
sectarian discrimination by the Iraqi government which was put in place by the 
American invaders forced them to join ISIS and left them with no choice. 
The third group is the opportunistic fighters: This group wants to go back to how things 
were before the American invasion, and even though this group is small in number, but 
it has weight in the media and in other areas.  
For example, ISIS fought with other Salafi-Jihadi groups like Jaish Al-Moujahedeen 
faction which is widely popular and supported in the Sunni street, but on the other hand 
it made an alliance with an opportunistic faction like Jaish tariq al naqshabandi which 
has a Secular-Ba’athist sway.”  (Al Mukhtar, 2014) 
ISIS also tries to appeal to those who feel not only physically oppressed, but also to those who 
feel like their religious and cultural identity is being threatened by the hegemony of Shia/Iran, 
Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, the official spokesperson of ISIS says in an audio statement titled, 
“O Our People Respond to the Caller of Allah”: 
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“O Ahlus-Sunnah everywhere and we specially mention those in Iraq, you have begun to 
experience with the Rāfidah a reality that we had warned you about in the past. You 
have begun to live it as a reality and witness it with the eye of certainty, in Baghdad, 
Dayālā, al-Anbār, Karkūk, and Salahuddīn. You are not unaware of the abductions, 
murders, eviction of Ahlus-Sunnah every day in Baghdad. A Sunnī has no courage to 
reveal his religion there, nor is it possible for him to enter it. Who among you is able to 
name his son ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, or Mu’āwiyah? Who among you can enter Baghdad 
today? The Rāfidah do not allow a Sunnī to enter Baghdad. Rather they don’t even allow 
those falsely considered as “Sunnī” to enter it.” (Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, 2012) 
There are definitely various reasons that drive people to join ISIS, these reasons are differ based 
on the individual himself 
“There are people that we can reason with, open a dialogue with and silence the guns. 
There are families being killed every days, there are entire families who are homeless 
and displaced…everyone spoke about Kobani and the tragedy of the Izedis, without 
even considering that 13 million Sunnis from 11 years now are being killed, displaced 
and cleansed.  
There are 4 million Sunnis refugees outside of Iraq, there are 2.350 million displaced 
Sunnis inside Iraq, 435 thousand Sunni detainees many of those are female, all of these 
factors cannot bring us a peaceful/national party. 
There is enormous pressure that feel on the Sunnis of Iraq that forced them to ask ISIS 
for protection. (Al Mukhtar, 2014) 
ISIS don’t believe in dialogue or negotiations, so what I mean by dialogue is that the 
largest group in ISIS (the oppressed group), could be drawn away from ISIS by giving the 
Sunnis of Iraq their rights, and lift the oppression that fell upon them by the Iraqi 
governments that were installed consensually between Iran and the USA.  
For example, amongst the 14 demands that were raised by the Sunni tribes/the military 
council of the rebels at the beginning of this year –these demands fell apart after the 
military council fell apart- among those demands was the release of more than 3000 
detained women, amending the constitution, restoring the mandatory military draft 
system so there should be a balance in the military institution between Sunnis and 
Shias, the restore of the civil law in Iraq because now every sect has its own legislations. 
These 14 demands by the Sunnis, even Maliki himself said that most of these demands 
are constitutional, the vice prime minster said that they’re all constitutional. 
These rights, in case they were restored to the Sunnis, some ISIS members might go 
back to their daily lives since there will be nothing for them to fight for anymore. 
This is what I mean, I mean that we should take away the legitimacy from ISIS and the 
reasons ISIS use to recruit and attract volunteers. 
90% of the Sunnis in Iraq hate ISIS, but because they resent Iran more, they won’t stand 
in the face of ISIS. (Al Mukhtar, 2014) 
25 
 
 
Sageman´s study of global salafi jihadism 
Sageman´s background study is not based on ISIS members’ background, but it is an overall 
study trying to answer questions about what kind of background the Salafi jihadists have, and 
explaining the possible factors which may lead people to join Salafi jihadi groups. In order to 
better understand why people join ISIS, we want to examine some studies, and we argue that 
Sageman´s and Coolsaet´s background studies are able to expose a little bit of possible ISIS 
members and their supporters background.  
Sageman uses a term “The global salafi jihad” to explain a type of terrorism which 
characteristic feature is a strong faith, and its members are even willing to “die and kill” in 
order to follow their religious faith. (Sageman 2004 p.61) He argues that this type of terrorism 
can only be understood in its own “religious context”. (Sageman 2004 p.61) He also mentions a 
term, mujahid, which means an Islamic fighter who is a part of the jihad, the religious fight 
against infidels. (Sageman, 2004) Sageman states that these peoples´ goal is to create “an 
Islamic state”, and to do so they fight against the states who do not follow the right religion 
Islam. (Sageman, 2004 p.61)  
Sageman is focused on Muslim terrorists and he doesn’t include “non-Muslim terrorists” or 
salafi jihadists who are part of “domestic insurgency” and “fight against their own 
governments.” (Sageman 2004, p.62)  
In order to understand “global salafi jihadi terrorism” and the background of mujahideen’s 
Marc Sageman illustrates connecting factors which leads people to join terrorist groups in his 
research “Understanding Terror Networks”. He separates three different factors: “social 
background, psychological make-up and circumstances of joining the jihad”. (Coolsaet, 2011 p. 
133)  
To his study Sageman used memoirs of “172 global Salafi Jihadis” who were part of terrorist 
actions in the 1990-century to the beginning of the 2000- century. (Coolsaet, 2011 p. 133)   
Sageman examined 172 individuals’ data which he gathered from public sources. 
We adduce brightly Sageman´s data about the background of the global salafi jihadists, looking 
into Sageman´s “social background” and “joining the jihad. (Sageman, 2004) We only have 
included some of Sageman´s variables, which we find relevant to our work. And because of that 
we are focusing on social background and social affiliation. 
 
Social background:  
Regarding Sageman’s data on Salafi jihadists, he introduces the background of the people.  
Sageman argues that “looking at the sample as a whole about two-thirds of the 172 mujahedin 
in the sample come from Saudi- Arabia (31), Egypt (24), France (18), Algeria (15), Morocco (14) 
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and Indonesia (12).” (Sageman, 2004 p.70) “The first consist of the Central Staff of al Qaeda and 
of the global Salafi jihad movement in general.” (Sageman, 2004 p.70) Sageman further argues 
that this group plays a big part in planning the attacks. The second largest group is formed by 
individuals who come from “Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait” which form “the Core 
Arab States“. (Sageman, 2004 p.70) The third group is formed by “Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia” 
“known as Maghreb”. (Sageman, 2004 p.70)  This sample also includes people “who were born 
and grew up in France”, but whose parents were originally from the Maghreb. (Sageman, 2004 
p.70) We don´t focus on Sageman´s fourth largest group “Southeast Asians” since our focus is 
on Arab and European countries.   
Sageman divided the terrorists into three different socioeconomic classes. He put them “into 
upper, middle, and lower class, according to the socioeconomic status of the terrorists´ families 
of origin.”(Sageman, 2004 p. 73) Sageman states that out of 102 individuals’ education data “18 
were upper class, 56 were middle class, and 28 were lower class.” (Sageman, 2004 p.73)  So 
based on his data he argues that the jihadi fighters do not come from any particular class, the 
socioeconomic situation isn´t the factor which lead people to join global Salafi jihad groups. As 
a weakness of this data Sageman says that “the Central Staff“ and “the Core Arabs”, which are 
the dominating groups are over presented in this sample, which may lead to a bit falsely 
assumption of the data. (Sageman, 2004 p.73) This point about socioeconomic class is 
interesting to us in showing that the reason behind joining radical Salafi groups is more identity 
based and more related to the feeling of being treated unjustly, rather than a simple financial 
incentive.  
Sageman´s data shows following about the religious background of the sample´s individuals. 
“There was information on childhood faith of 117 people; of those 9 were Christians who must 
be removed from the sample. Of the rest, 53 (49 percent) were described as religious 
children.”(Sageman, 2004 p.77) He found differences in faith depending on the region where 
the person came from. “The Maghreb” group showed lower percentage of religious faith as a 
youth. Regarding the people from “The Central Staff”- area, the number of religious children 
was higher. (Sageman, 2004 p.77) So based on this data we could argue that most of the people 
have had a religious youth and this might be a big factor why these people have decided to be 
involved in global Salafi jihad terrorism. 
 
This point is interesting to us in showing that those who could be reached by religious speech 
will be more prone to join radical Salafi-Jihadi organizations like ISIS because of the following 
reasons: 
1-ISIS’s raising power will increase its ability to market itself, preach to those individuals and 
facilitate them to join its ranks. 
2-The inflamed emotional/religious zeal that is created in those individuals because of the rising 
power of a group like ISIS will make them more prone to reach out to it.  
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Social affiliation  
Sageman argues that social affiliation plays a big part of if a person joins a jihad group. The risk 
seems to be higher if a friend or family member is a part of a global Salafi jihad organization.  
“150 individuals” information about joining, “68 percent” who joined jihad had a friend in and 
“14 percent” had a family member who were part of a Salafi jihad organization. (Sageman, 2004 
p.111-112)  
So based on this sample we could argue that joining a jihad could be easier and also more 
tempting when a close person is already a part of it, or joining together with friends might 
lower the step to join. 
Social affiliation could shed some light on the point that some people join ISIS or other Salafi-
Jihadi groups for no reason other than being close or around a network that pulls them into its 
ranks, so the motives or reasons for joining are less ideological or economical and more 
personal and social, which means that there is a certain number of people will keep joining 
terrorist groups from abroad and the only way to stop these individuals is dismantling these 
networks that pulls this segment of people towards the Jihad. 
 
Coolesaet and the European cases: 
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(Coolsaet, 2011 p.139) 
Because Isis has members all over Europe and many people even flee from Europe to join it, we 
also want to examine the background of Europeans who have been part of terrorist attacks in 
Europe.  
Using Coolsaet´s newer data (table 10.1) about European fighters’ background (data is updated 
in 2011 for the second edition) gives us an important information of his samples terrorists´ 
background. In his study Coolesaet uses data of “65 cases of jihadi terrorism” between 2001- 
2009 in Europe. (Coolsaet, 2011 p.138-139) He studied 336 personal backgrounds and divided 
them into three groups, following Sagemans “methodological framework”, which includes 
“social background, psychological make-up and circumstances of joining the jihad”. (Coolsaet, 
2011 p. 138-139) Coolsaet has also compared his study and Sageman´s study about global salafi 
jihadists.  We only use the information about the terrorists´ social background and social 
affiliation. And in the social affiliation chapter we also include Scott Atran´s study about how 
people are recruited to Isis. 
 
Social background: 
Coolesaet points following things from the table 10.1. Many of the people are not originally 
from Europe but from Northern Africa. “Only 23 persons have family origin in Europe but many 
of them were from a mixed marriage or converts (bottom of table 10.1 (3)).” (Coolsaet, 2011 
p.139) About examined person’s nationalities Coolesaet points that “out of the 304 individuals 
of whom information could be found, 68 Moroccans, 58 are Algerians and 54 Britons.” 
(Coolsaet, 2011 p. 39) These 3 nationalities form significant ethnic groups. Comparing Coolsaets 
data to Sageman´s, we can see that Morocco, UK and Algeria have a big role on both studies. 
And that majority of the people have a Muslim background. 
Regarding the terrorists’ socio-economic background Coolsaet remarks that most of the people 
come from lower socio- economic classes. The data, which was found of 93 people, “only 5 can 
be regarded as upper-class, 36 middle class and 52 lower class.” (Coolsaet, 2011 p.140) 
Coolsaet compared his data to Sageman´s global salafi jihadist data in which people didn’t 
belong to any common socio-economic class. (Sageman 2004 p.73) In Coolsaet´s sample, 
coming from a lower socioeconomic class, could be one factor which drives people to find 
justice by being a part of a jihad group. Sageman notices in his study that Muslims in France 
particularly come from a lower socioeconomic class, and in Coolsaet´s study French people and 
people from France are also presented in his table 10.1 as one of the countries which are in the 
top of the list of terrorist attacks. 
Religious data in Coolsaet´s sample. “Information on the childhood faith was found for 56 
persons; 19 of them were converts: 18 persons with a Christian and one with a Hindu 
background. Of the rest, 11 were raised in a religious family and 26 did not have a particularly 
religious childhood.” (Coolsaet, 2011 p.140) Coolsaet states that based on his data many of the 
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people didn´t have very religious background. (Coolsaet, 2011 p.140) But because Coolsaet´s 
sample is not very comprehensive, it is hard to make any broader assumptions.  
 
Social affiliation: 
Kinship plays a big part of Coolsaet´s data. 334 individual’s data showed that 62 persons had a 
family member in a jihad organization. Also friendship was a major indicator for the recruiting 
process. (Coolsaet, 2011 p.142) Coolsaet points a difference between his study and Sageman´s, 
regarding kinship. Kinship played a much bigger part in his study, opposite Sageman´s study. 
But in both studies social affiliation plays a big part of the recruiting process. (Coolsaet, 2011 
p.143) 
Scott Atran, an academic from Oxford University, argues that a notable amount of foreign 
people join through friendship. In his table “How are foreign fighters recruited to Isis? “ 75% are 
recruited through friends and 25% through kinship to ISIS. And only 5% of all the cases the 
recruitment has taken place in a Mosque. In his report Atran argues that in a radicalisation 
process Mosques don’t play a big part as an environment, where people get recruited. But 
more the environment outside, where people spend time with their friends. Atran argues that 
the Mosques play only a very little part as a recruiting place for ISIS. (INDEPENDENT 2015) 
Like Sageman and Coolsaet argued in their studies, social affiliation plays a major role in the 
recruiting process. Atran’s argument supports Sageman´s data where 58 percent of global salafi 
jihadists had a friend in terrorist organisation when they joined in. And also in his study, 75 
percent of the foreign fighters who joined ISIS had a friend in ISIS. (Sageman, 2004 p.111-112) 
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(INDEPENDENT 2015)  
 
In the next chapter we examine motivations based on Annika Waldeck´s Master thesis “The 
ideology of ISIS – a motivation for Europeans to become foreign fighters?” about fighters and 
their motivations to join ISIS, where she talks about the oppression which Muslims experience 
in Europe, and how that can turn them to join ISIS. 
 
Motivations behind joining: 
Annika Waldeck examined in her Master Thesis, “The ideology of ISIS – a motivation for 
Europeans to become foreign fighters? “ the motivations behind people who leave Europe and 
travel to Syria to become a fighter. Even though many people who join ISIS are from Northern 
Africa Waldeck is focusing on fighters who come from Europe. She argues that most of the 
foreign fighters want to join Isis in Syria. She uses ICSR as a source to support her argument 
“According to the ICSR estimations the majority joins either Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS.” (Waldeck 
2015 p.37)  
Waldeck argues that the reason why these Europeans join ISIS is because they feel like they are 
treated like second class citizens in their home country and they are searching for their identity 
and they are feeling a bit lost. The other reason Waldeck points out is simply boredom. And the 
third is that Muslims in Europe sympathize with their fellow Muslims in Syria who feel that they 
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are left under the tyranny of Bashir Al- Assad regime. The fourth reason is religious reasons. 
(Waldeck, 2015) 
Oppression of the Muslims in Europe: 
Waldeck’s first argument is “a significant proportion of the young Muslims in European 
countries have problems building up their own identity.” (Waldeck, 2015 p. 39) She argues 
using Denmark as an example country. She refers to Khaterah Parwani, a Danish social worker 
who says that “it is harder for the Muslims to become accepted into the society.” (Waldeck, 
2015 p.39) Also because the media always represents Muslims and their religion in a negative 
light. (Waldeck, 2015 p.39) 
Waldeck also refers to Coolesaet who argues that Muslims feel that they don’t have the same 
opportunities as the natives in Europe. And when people won´t feel that they are accepted to 
the society they will find acceptance elsewhere. “The reconstruction of the ummah (Nation of 
people bound together in Islam) in one place plays a major role here.” (Waldeck, 2015 p. 40) 
Waldeck also argues that a bad socioeconomic situation might courage people to join ISIS. “A 
significant portion of the foreign fighters are people who failed in their lives in Europe. They 
have only part-time work if they are employed at all, are not doing well at school or have 
dropped out and are socially excluded. (Waldeck, 2015 p.40) 
So possible discrimination in the job market or different possibilities to get education than the 
main population, could be great motivators for people to get involved in radical movements in 
order to feel that they get justice. 
Boredom: 
The second factor which leads people to join ISIS according to Waldeck is seeking an adventure. 
Some people are looking for action in their lives and they are so called “jihad tourists”. 
(Waldeck, 2015 p.40) “They cross the border, get pictures taken with Kalashnikovs and then 
they go back” according to Jakob Sheikh. (Waldeck 2015 p.40-41) “The escape of the daily 
routine and the search for an adventure are in the focus of these foreign fighters.” (Waldeck, 
2015 p.40) 
 
Sympathy: 
Waldeck argues, that Sunni Muslims who feel that they are oppressed under the Shia 
government in Syria, receive sympathy from other Sunni Muslims in Europe. The Sunni Muslims 
feels that it is their duty to help. (Waldeck, 2015 p.42) “The collective duty becomes an 
individual duty.” (Waldeck, 2015 p.42) The duty towards Sunni Muslims in Syria and the 
sympathy they feel towards the Sunnis who live under the power of Bashir al- Assad- regime is 
a motivator for Muslims from Europe to join ISIS. (Waldeck, 2015 p.42) Waldeck also argues 
that Sunnis are also frustrated of western countries unresponsive and ignorant attitude 
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towards the leading Shia government’s cruelty towards Sunni Muslims. This is another reason 
why Sunnis around the world join Isis. (Waldeck, 2015 p.42-43) 
 
Religion:  
Waldeck states that creating an Islamic state is an inducement for joining ISIS. “They perceive it 
an honour to be part of a battle which was prophesied 1400 years ago by several hadith (the 
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) that call Syria the land of jihad. A battle between Muslim 
armies will take place there, and lead to the end of times. It gives a good opportunity to fighters 
to die as martyrs since extremist sheikhs (Islamic leader or cleric) promise a better afterlife for 
those who die fighting the ‘infidel’ enemy.” (Waldeck, 2015 p.43)  
Khaterah Parwani stated that “although a proportion of the foreign fighters come from very 
religious families, the majority “does not practise Islam at home” (Waldeck, 2015 p.40). So it is 
very hard to say how much ISIS fighters` religious position and religious background drives them 
to join Isis. In Coolsaet´s European sample many people didn´t come from religious families, but 
in Sageman´s global Salafi jihadi sample especially Core Arabs had a very religious childhood. It 
is hard to make any assumptions based on these two studies and draw an outline to Isis 
members´ religious background. The religion definitely plays a big part of ISIS´ ideology and it is 
also an important feature to notice when people join ISIS, but since religion is not the only 
reason when it comes to joining ISIS, then other social and political factors play just as much of 
a role as the religious one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Illustration 1: Foreign fighters flow to Syria”  
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 (Waldeck, 2015 p.38) 
 
Origins of foreign fighters: 
Waldeck´s illustration from International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ISCR), shows information about the numbers of foreign fighters travelling to Syria 
from 2011 to 2014. (Waldeck, 2015 p.36)  
But Waldeck also states that the numbers aren´t accurate. “There is furthermore the possibility 
that not all of the persons joined an organisation. Included in the 4000 Europeans is everybody 
who left for Syria, hence they do not necessarily have to be still in Syria, nor even alive.” 
(Waldeck, 2015 p.37) 
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About the European fighters Waldeck points that “The largest European countries, Germany, 
France and the UK, have contributed the highest absolute figures, while Denmark, Belgium and 
Sweden have the highest numbers when expressed as a proportion of their population.” 
(Walbeck 2015 p.37) Also Coolsaet showed in his table 10.1 that these same European 
countries as Waldeck pointed above are represented in his table. Also in Sageman´s study UK 
was one of the essential countries in which jihadi fighters come from.  
Based on Sageman’s and Coolsaet´s background study and ISCR´s illustration of “Foreign 
fighters flown to Syria” we can argue that there can be some link drawn to that people from 
Northern Africa tend to join Isis. Also Saudi-Arabia`s and Jordanian’s part is noticeable because 
of similar Wahhabi ideology between ISIS and Saudi Arabia and the personal/tribal networks 
that makes it easier to get in contact with ISIS and individuals wanting to join. 
 
Sageman pointed three main groups where global salafi jihadists come from: the Central Staff, 
the Core Arab States and the Maghreb. Also we can see from Illustration 1 that from these 
countries people tend to join Isis more than people from elsewhere. The information based on 
these studies we could argue that the countries from where people leave to join jihad haven´t 
changed much since Sageman´s study from 2004 to ISCR´s illustration of “Foreign fighters flow 
to Syria” in 2014. And based on Isis popularity it is the most appealing jihad organisations at the 
moment. 
  
CONCLUSION: As Coolsaet agrees with Sageman that we cannot make universal assumptions of 
jihadists backgrounds, nor to say that they are coming from a certain type of background. 
Coolsaet pointed that the European terrorists he examined, and Sageman´s global salafi 
jihadists have similarities in their backgrounds like that many of the people have family origins 
in Muslim countries in Northern Africa, and joining a jihad organisation is more likely if a family 
member or a friend is a part of it. Coolsaet also argued with Waldeck that in their study the 
European jihadists came from lower class, and in Sageman´s study of global salafi jihadists there 
weren´t any common class. We can argue based on Sageman´s and Coolsaet´s and ISCR´s 
illustration of where Isis fighters come from that people are still joining from the same 
countries as Sageman´s data showed in 2004, Coolsaet´s data in 2011 and in ISCR´s illustration 
in 2014. The main reason why people join Isis from Europe is because they are unsatisfied of 
how their society treats them and feel that the only way they could become accepted is to 
change their surroundings to a more welcoming one. In European cases these are important 
features to notice when it comes to the possible racism and oppression that Muslims might 
experience in Europe.  
Also the fighters from Arab countries especially the Sunni Salafists feel that the their countries 
are oppressing their attempts to fully apply Sharia (The rule of Allah) and that no one is doing 
anything to stop the Shia regime of Bashar al- Assad who is mass murdering and oppressing the 
Sunnis in Syria.  
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According to Waldeck´s, Sageman´s and Coolsaet´s data we argue that a person who originates 
in Northern Africa, comes from a Muslim background, has a friend or family member in Isis and 
who feels oppressed in his/hers society is more likely to join Isis than a person who doesn´t 
have these features in his/her life. Any of these features doesn´t guarantee that a person will 
join Isis but it is creating a big possibility to it. 
Furthermore, these studies could be compared to similar studies in the Arab world that needs 
to be conducted on the social/national background of people joining these radical Salafi groups, 
which will be interesting to see how and why the background of radical Salafi-Jihadi leaderships 
has changed in the region from a regional command (Saudi Arabian and Egyptian like Osama 
bin Laden and his successor Zawahiri) into more localised command both in both Iraq and Syria 
(the leaderships of ISIS form Zarkawi to Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi now, were all Iraqi nationals and 
Al-Qaida in Syria has a Syrian leader Abu Mohamad Al-Joulani). 
 
Brainwash and mind control: 
One of the first times in history we had an example of brainwashing was back in the 1950´s. At 
that time, the people from the communist Symbionese Liberation Army abducted a girl named 
Patty Hearst. The people from the communist Symbionese Liberation Army tortured and raped 
her. Nevertheless, she joined the group afterwards, despite the fact that she was tortured and 
raped. Patty Hearst was an example of brainwash, because she would never have joined the 
group at first hand. The group assaulted her, and took her against her own will. 
When you look at the mind control concept, compared to brainwash, it is much more refined. 
In the brainwash example, the people from the Symbionese Liberation Army assaulted a girl 
and forced/brainwashed her into the group. In the mind control concept, you more get 
persuaded/seduced by a recruiter. The recruiter will try to connect to you on a more emotional 
level. When you are in the “net” of the recruiter, you will often see them as friends or mentors. 
It could also be a person you look up to, and therefore it becomes much more refined. 
Moreover, the indoctrination seems more anchored in the person because of the “shared 
thoughts”.  
This is the start of the “grooming” period where everything is new and pleasant. Nevertheless, 
when Islamic State has the hooks into you they become more brutal. Now they begin to 
threaten you and your family – if you do not accept the circumstances. 
When people are caught in the “net” of mind control, they do not often make good choices. 
Often they do not know what they are joining. They have just received a certain amount of 
information, and therefore it is very vague what they know about “the project”. 
As a former cult member of the Moonies, and author of Combating Mind Control, Steven 
Hassan said:  
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“Like my group [the Moonies] – I thought we were going to end poverty, end war, end 
crime, make an ideal kingdom of heaven on earth. That was the fantasy that I was told 
initially; it wasn't a religious group at all. And, within two weeks, I find out we're all 
bowing to an altar, praying for God to help the messiah to take over the world, and we'll 
all speak Korean. I only found out two years into it that we would kill everybody who 
didn't convert – which is exactly what ISIS is doing” (Vice, 2015) 
Steven Hassan´s experience with the Moonies and Islamic States mind control are alike. He 
discovered that the Moonies would kill everyone who did not join them. It is like when the 
Islamic state has the hooks into you. If you do not obey Islamic State, they will make death 
threats for you and your family. 
When Islamic State radicalizes people if often seems like that, they are making bad decisions. 
The radicalized individuals often have a predicate that they are lunatics – why could they 
otherwise 
convert to something that wrong. They have been stigmatized by the society. However, you 
have to step inside the mind of the radicalized person to understand the motivation behind. 
What have the Islamic State set in motion to radicalize them? What have Islamic State set in 
motion so they are prepared to fight their cause? 
To get a better understanding of mind control and indoctrinating we will have to look at the 
tactics. There was a four-part model, which Steven Hassan was using in the Moonies, when he 
was a recruiter/indoctrinator. There are four categories in this model where people belong; 
they are believers, thinkers, doers or feelers. Therefore, an analysis is needed when you try 
convert people.  
As Steven Hassan says:  
“And so, as you're talking to this prospective convert, you want to analyze them. 
Because if they're a thinker, you're going to want to talk very intellectually and 
engage them in a very abstract way. If they're feelers, you want them to feel like 
they're loved and they're a part of a community, and it's very emotion-driven. If 
they're very justice-orientated, it's about saving lives, it's about protecting 
children, it's about fighting the evil and enemies that are repressing our people. 
Or if they're believers – then God has chosen you. At a certain time in your life, 
depending on the context and who you're hanging out with, one of those four 
angles can find a way into you”( Vice, 2015) 
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A part of this conversion of people was to control these four categories. When you control this, 
you can get people to obey you. Furthermore, you can recreate people’s identity, as you want 
it. Islamic State can therefore create your identity, as they want. When you are at this level of 
indoctrination, you will no longer follow the people behind the ideology. What you think you 
follow, is the divine. 
People are often categorized as psychopaths or criminals. However, when you try to 
understand why people are doing this, we have to look at the social environmental influence.  
Social environmental influence is often more the reason why people join Islamic state and not a 
“human error” as people often call it. In social psychology, is goes under the name: “the 
fundamental attribution of error”. 
 As Steven Hassan said:  
“And very simply, what it refers to is that when people try to understand what 
other people are doing, they have this error, or a bias, to over-attributing 
personality variables and under attributing social, environmental influences”. 
(Vice, 2015) 
To get a better understanding of this, we need to look at people before Islamic state “catch” 
them in the recruitment process. A lot of them have good educational backgrounds, and are 
moral people from good homes as well. However, Islamic state is transforming them, as they 
want them to be.  
A part of this transformation takes places online. Islamic states idea is to get the “hooks” into 
you so you will return for more indoctrination. You think it is your own choice, but it is not. 
Steven Hassan defines this as “Double blind”, and as he said:  
“Double bind is where the manipulator or hypnotist is giving an illusion of choice. 
But whatever the person does, they need to do what you want them to do”. (Vice, 
2015) 
Therefore, Islamic state must have studied social psychology, so they could use it in their 
propaganda “machine”. 
Furthermore, Islamic state tries to manipulate young people so they will not tell their parents. 
They will do this, so family and friends will not break the influence. This is why “groomed” 
people often keep it to themselves. Moreover, Islamic state tries not to change people 
dramatically from day to day. A dramatic change would alert the families, and they would react 
to it. Nevertheless, as seen so often before, when parents try to talk young people out of it, 
they even get deeper into it. When parents try to use their authority it gives the opposite result 
as wanted, and that is a huge fail according to Steven Hassan. 
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Many new converted Islamic state members are promoting their new lifestyle. They are 
promoting it on the social Medias. They are doing this as a part of their new identity. Islamic 
state tells them what to do – and of course, they are doing it. They are surrounded by people 
who think this is normal and expected. This is why the most sadistic behavior is normal to them. 
They does not see a person as a human being anymore, they are “programmed” elsewise. They 
can kill a person and just think they get rid of a devil. They think this is a part of making a “pure” 
sharia Islamic state. 
Steven Hassan gives an example from a religious cult called Heaven’s gate:  
“So the people who died at Heaven's Gate [a religious cult group] in 1997 – they didn't 
think they were committing suicide. They thought they were leaving their container – 
their loaded language for the body – so they could beam up to the spaceship that they 
were told was waiting to take them back home. They weren't really humans; they were 
from another planet”. (Vice, 2015) 
 
Is it possible to leave the Islamic state for the indoctrinated, and how do we 
tackle the recruitment of the Islamic state? 
 
As indoctrinated, it is possible to leave the Islamic State. If you still have an intact identity, it is 
possible to help you. However, most of the indoctrinated people run away. They have been 
programmed by the Islamic state, and therefore they run away. They think it is better to kill 
themselves instead of leaving the Islamic state. 
What we could do is getting young people to understand influence techniques. If they got more 
education, they could easier escape the “net” of the Islamic state. Furthermore, there needs to 
be a recovery for ex-members. Those ex-members of Islamic state needs to understand what 
have happened to them. This would also disarm them as a threat to the society. Moreover, 
many of those ex-members from the Islamic state could be valuable to the society. They could 
participate in the education of young people, and function as a spokesperson as well.         
 
 
A case of indoctrination/brainwash from the Middle East: 
A religious minority from Iraq, called the Yazidi´s, got overrun last year by the Islamic state. 
Islamic State abducted the Yazidi boys from the village, and brutally the killed men. 
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Furthermore, they abducted women and girls. The Islamic state used those women and girls as 
sex slaves. However, the Islamic State tried to indoctrinate/brainwash the Yazidi boys from the 
village. They gave each boy a wooden sword so they could learn to behead people. Islamic State 
wanted to indoctrinate the Yazidi boys into the extremist branch of Islam they exercise. They 
try to convert them into extremist jihadi fighters. 
 As it is emphasized in the story of Yahya, a Yazidi child who managed to flee:  
“But dozens of young Yazidi boys like Yahya had a different fate: The group sought to re-
educate them. They forced them to convert to Islam from their ancient faith and then 
tried to turn them into jihadi extremist fighters.” (Associated Press, 2015) 
 
Islamic state tries to indoctrinate/educate/brainwash a new generation of extremist jihadi 
fighters. They give gifts and cash to the youth to get them in the “net”. However, intimidating 
and brainwash is an extreme method they use as well – like the case with “Yahya”. Those 
methods of the Islamic state have one purpose, to make young killers. The young killers of 
Islamic state are brainwashed into doing brutal things, like beheading other children or even 
use themselves as suicide bombers. 
But Islamic state does not only abduct and brainwash children. They also try to indoctrinate 
them via the local mosques – even schools. In the schools and mosques they try to get the 
children to turn against their own family. When those children have been turned against their 
family, they will start the training in one of Islamic states training camps. Here they will start 
their education into becoming an extremist jihadi fighter – a fighter for the caliphate.  
As it is emphasized by Abu Hafs Naqshabandi (Syrian Sheik who run religion classes where he 
teaches about Islamic State)  
"They are planting extremism and terrorism in young people's minds," and “I am 
terribly worried about future generations." (Associated Press, 2015) 
Normally Islamic state would only/mainly try to indoctrinate children of Sunni Muslims. 
However, as we saw with the Yazidi children, Islamic state has expanded their “hunting field”. 
Yazidis, as a minority would normally just be slaughtered, but now the Islamic state tries to 
indoctrinate their youth. As it is emphasized:  
“The indoctrination mainly targets the Sunni Muslim children living under IS rule. 
But the abduction of the Yazidis, whom IS considers heretics ripe for slaughter, 
shows how the group sought even to take another community's youth, erase its 
past and replace it with IS radicalism.” (Associated Press, 2015) 
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Furthermore, Islamic state tries to erase the past of the children. In the case with the abducted 
Yazidi child “Yahya”, they renamed them so they had Arabic names instead of Kurdish. 
Nevertheless, this was not enough. The abducted Yazidi children also had to beat each other, as 
a part of the training, in the Islamic states training camps. Furthermore, they also did exercises 
and studied the Quran as a part of the training. Yahya even had to punch his brother who was 
only 10 years old at the time. As it is emphasized by Yahya:  
“”I was forced to do that. (The trainer) said that if I didn't do it, he'd shoot me," he 
said. "They ... told us it would make us tougher. They beat us everywhere with 
their fists." (Associated Press, 2015) 
In the example with Yahya we saw how extreme those training camps could be. However, this is 
not the first explored training camp. 
Training camps/ preparation camps seems to be a part of the masterplan to consolidate their 
power in the future. In a recently found/translated blueprint from Islamic state it occurs that 
they are indoctrinating the children so they will become jihadi fighters. As it is emphasized in 
the translated Islamic state blueprint:  
“The camp includes sharia sessions in fiqh of doctrine and rulings, with special 
sessions in Islamic society and manners, and training on bearing light arms and the 
principles of use.” (The Guardian, 2015) 
Furthermore, Islamic state has video documented other training camps where children gets 
indoctrinated/trained. As it is emphasized: 
“IS videos from other training camps show young boys in military fatigues 
marching with weapons, crawling under barbed wire and practicing shooting. One 
child lies on the ground and fires a machine gun; he's so small that the recoil 
bounces his whole body back a few inches. Other scenes show boys undergoing 
endurance training. They stand unmoving as a trainer punches them or hits their 
heads with a pole. They lie on the ground as a trainer walks on them.” (Associated 
Press, 2015) 
However, the recruiting part often starts on the streets where Islamic state connects with the 
youth. Islamic state shows them propaganda videos, and tries to indoctrinate the Jihad. The 
parents try desperately to avoid the Islamic state. Therefore, they take their children out of 
school so they do not get indoctrinated into jihad. 
Islamic state even tries to recruit children in the refugee camps. They pay those 
children/students around 110 dollars each.   
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Chapter conclusion: 
 
This chapter has shown how Islamic state uses refined persuasion techniques/social psychology 
skills (mind control) to indoctrinate young people from the Western world. It is often a family 
member/friend/relative/the local imam who starts the indoctrination of the young people. 
Therefore, it is much more refined and more difficult for parents/surroundings to find out what 
is going on. However, mind control is just one thing in the wide range of tools Islamic state is 
using. When young people try to escape the “net” of Islamic state, they use fear as a tool. They 
instill fear into the young people by threatening their families. 
In the case from the Middle East, we saw how Islamic state is indoctrinating young people by 
brainwashing them. Islamic state will mainly target Sunni Muslims, but as we saw in the case 
from the Middle East, they are expanding their “hunting fields”. They abducted the children and 
forced them to participate in training camps where the most brutal things happened. Things 
like: training in beheading dolls/people, punching/fighting their own family, weapon training 
and read the Quran like Islamic state wants them to. However, the Islamic state also gave them 
candy and money to get them to fight their cause as well. 
We must conclude that Islamic state does everything possible to get young people to fight their 
cause. In the Middle East they abduct young people and brainwash/indoctrinates them by 
putting them into extreme Jihadi training camps.  
It is a bit more difficult for them to recruit people in the Western world, where they cannot 
abduct and brainwash people in the same way as in the Middle East.  Thus, Islamic state has to 
use friends/family and refined persuasion techniques to catch their victims in the “net”. 
According to the translated blueprint of Islamic state, the targeting of young people is a part of 
their strategy/masterplan to consolidate their power. Therefore, we must conclude that they 
will keep on abducting/indoctrinating/brainwashing/mind controlling their victims to 
consolidate their power now and in the future.  
 
Paper’s conclusion: 
Our research question was: what role does the recent disfranchisement of the Sunnis play in 
ISIS’s rise to power? 
The answer to that as we saw throughout the paper is that, recent disfranchisement of the 
Sunnis play a major role in ISIS’s rise to power. 
What we tried to prove is that when the Iraqi state was destroyed by the American invasion, a 
vacuum of power was created, which allowed regional and international forces to start 
manipulating Iraq for their benefits. 
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This manipulation was eventually settled with an American/Iranian understanding, where the 
Shia of Iraq rule the country with a Sunni inclusion into power, but when the Shia government 
of Iraq backed out of that understanding, and started persecuting Sunnis, ISIS started it’s 
resurrection process after being almost wiped out. 
Additionally, the Arab spring which reached Syria –which is next door to Iraq- gave ISIS a golden 
opportunity to move into Syria, exploit the chaos and start building considerable economic and 
military force, which it later used to move back into Iraq and break into prisons freeing 
thousands of Sunni prisoners, occupying large areas of Iraq and declaring the Caliphate, thus 
gaining more recruits, more power and most importantly more legitimacy as a guardian and 
defender of the oppressed Sunnis. 
 
The consequences of the oppression of Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, was not only the 
empowerment and the rise of ISIS as radical Sunni-Salafi group, but also the fact that it shifted 
Sunni-Salafi leaderships from the being mostly from the GCC –Saudi Arabia mostly- and Egypt 
like Osama Bin Laden and his successor Zawahiri to the new generation of leaders from Syria 
and Iraq, that poses a threat to Saudi control over the direction of the Salafi movement and the 
Saudi legitimacy as a Sunni-Salafi leader in the world, and hence we see the Saudis declaring an 
Islamic-Sunni alliance to fight ISIS. 
 
Furthermore, the disfranchisement of the Sunnis on the hand of the Shias, shifted the Salafi-
Jihadi ideology from mainly targeting the United States (The great devil) and Israel (The small 
devil) as the classic Al-Qaida ideology put it, into targeting The Shia rafyda8 and the 
Alawite/Shia regime in Syria as ISIS is now preaching, which means that the oppression of 
Sunnis have fundamentally changed the Salafi-Jihadi world as well and hence it’s a major factor 
that needs to be addressed. 
The rise and empowerment of ISIS increased its ability to communicate and further reach 
disgruntled Sunni-Muslims all over the world, and control their minds and direct it into the very 
real tragedy of the oppressed Sunnis, for the political purpose of recruiting those individuals 
into its cause. 
 
These recruited individuals –whether in Europe or the Middle East- risk so much to be part of a 
radical group like ISIS, and no doubt that most of them share the same reasons for joining 
which could be money or religion/ideology or stature or social disfranchisement, but the most 
important reason is that they think of themselves as “Paladins” fighting to protect the rights of 
the oppressed and to stand up for the weak. 
And as long as we choose not to address the problem of the disfranchisement of the Sunnis in 
the Middle East, as long as we let this cold war goes on where the majority of the Sunnis are 
not ruling themselves or at least under the impression that they are ruling themselves, we will 
keep having recruits joining the ranks of ISIS from all over the world, and ISIS will keep 
exploiting this “moral gap” in our approach to the Middle East to further its agenda and 
                                                          
8 Rejecters of the Muslim faith 
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promote itself as the moral guardian of the Sunnis. 
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